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Abstract: While increasing attention has been paid in recent years to the relation 
between Foucault's conception of critique and Kant’s, much controversy remains 
over whether Foucault’s most sustained early engagement with Kant, his disserta-
tion on Kant’s Anthropology, should be read as a wholesale rejection of Kant’s views 
or as the source of Foucault’s late return to ethics and critique. In this paper, I 
propose a new reading of the dissertation, considering it alongside 1950s-era ar-
chival materials of which I advance the first scholarly appraisal. I argue that Fou-
cault manifests a fundamental ambivalence to Kantian anthropology, rejecting it in 
theoretical terms while embracing its practical (‘pragmatic’) conception of the sub-
ject. Furthermore, I take these texts to collectively evidence Foucault’s attempt to 
situate himself within the anthropological-critical tradition rather than extricating 
himself from it. If we interpret Foucault to reject this tradition’s appeal to an es-
sentialized, theoretical conception of subjectivity, what remains of anthropology is 
its inherent practical reflexivity in structure. Thus, I situate Foucault’s conception 
of ethics as one’s relation to oneself in continuity with this tradition. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In recent years, increasing attention has been paid to Foucault’s notion of cri-
tique, both in relation to his genealogical practice (Williams 2002, Saar 2007, 
Koopman 2013) and more broadly (Butler 2002, Allen 2016, Tiisala 2017). As is 
widely acknowledged, one of Foucault’s primary interlocutors on the issue of cri-
tique is Kant, also the subject of Foucault’s second dissertation (thèse complémen-
taire) on Kant’s Anthropology (IKA),1 defended in 1961. While this literature has 
generally limited itself to texts dating from the 1970s and 1980s, IKA has begun to 
                                                             
1 References to Foucault adhere to the following abbreviation scheme: IKA = Introduction to Kant’s 
Anthropology; LL = 1952-3 Lille lectures (“Knowledge of Man and Transcendental Reflection”); 
OT = The Order of Things; HS2 and HS3 = History of Sexuality, volumes 2 and 3. 
References to Kant are to the volume and page of Kants gesammelte Schriften, except for CPR, which 
is to the standard A and B pagination, and accord with the following abbreviation scheme: APV = 
Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View; CPR = Critique of Pure Reason; CPJ = Critique of Judg-
ment; LA = Lectures on Anthropology; MM = Metaphysics of Morals; OP = Opus Postumum; WE = 
“What Is Enlightenment?” 
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attract increasing scholarly interest. However, much controversy remains over how 
to interpret the dissertation, as well as how it should inform more general views of 
Foucault’s work. Han-Pile (1998) argues that IKA demonstrates an incoherence in 
Foucault’s view, namely that there he critiques Kantian transcendental subjectivity 
while later helping himself to it in his late ethical period. McQuillan (2016) claims 
that IKA demonstrates Foucault’s debt to Heidegger in the 1950s and 1960s: Fou-
cault’s invocations of Kant in the 1970s and 1980s thereby mark a “radical” shift 
from his prior Heideggerian emphasis on limits to the transgression of limits, newly 
taking Kantian critical philosophy as the “obstacle to be overcome” (194, 197-8).2 
By contrast, Allen (2003, 2008) and Djaballah (2008) both take IKA to show an 
underlying continuity between Foucault’s early and late interest in Kant. Allen sug-
gests that APV provides Foucault with an example of a socially and historically 
conditioned, rather than transcendental, conception of the subject (2008: 37-44), 
while Djaballah claims that, with his conception of experience as constituted by 
discursive practice rather than thought alone, Foucault collapses the distinction be-
tween systematic and popular philosophical discourse initially instantiated by CPR 
and APV (2008: 12-13). 
As I show in this paper, some of these scholarly disputes can be clarified by 
reading IKA in light of the conceptions of critique and subjectivity Foucault delin-
eates in new archival materials, in particular his notes on Kant dating from the 
1950s and a course given at the University of Lille in 1952-3 (LL) in which Fou-
cault develops a genealogy of critique in the history of philosophy predating his 
1978 “What Is Critique?” by 25 years.3 Here I advance the first scholarly appraisal 
of these materials. In LL, Foucault argues that critique, from Kant onwards, merges 
divergent moral-political and epistemological strands. On the one hand, “Kant 
takes himself to be an Aufklärer [an agent of the Enlightenment]” (75), rendering 
Kantian critique distinctly political—a point to which Foucault will return 30 years 
later. On the other, the foundation of Kantian critique into the a priori conditions 
of knowledge is an “interrogation of man” (75), a claim anticipating Foucault’s ar-
gument in OT. Thus, on Foucault’s view, ‘critique’ takes on a new meaning from 
Kant onward, becoming both newly anthropological and newly politicized. In IKA, 
Foucault emphasizes the emergence of a ‘pragmatic’, both historically situated and 
practical, domain of reflection, which I suggest is presupposed in Foucault’s own 
analyses of the care of the self in late antiquity (1982, 1984d). In LL, Foucault 
                                                             
2 Although not my topic here, this thesis is disproved by Foucault (1963), where Kant is credited 
for posing the ‘limits’ of thought and eo ipso the possibility of their transgression; see also Allen 
(2008: 33). 
3 These sources have only recently become available for consultation in the archives of the Biblio-
thèque nationale de France in Paris and are therefore still largely unknown. 
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traces the legacy of critique through, among others, readings of Kant, Hegel, Feu-
erbach, Marx, and Nietzsche. 
Thus, while broadly sympathetic to Allen and Djaballah’s agreement as to the 
continuity of Foucault’s early and late interest in Kant, I stress here that Foucault’s 
own stance on the history of critique is fundamentally ambivalent. To grasp this 
point, it is helpful to keep in mind White Beck’s (1978) characterization of the 
history of the reception of Kant’s Critique as not merely critical, but ‘metacritical.’4 
That is, Kant’s successors adopted the critical framework of the Critique towards 
the end of calling the Critique itself into question. Resituating Foucault as a meta-
critic allows us to see that, for him, this philosophical tradition encompasses both 
negative and positive aspects, while nevertheless positioning Foucault himself 
squarely within it. While some Foucault scholars have taken for granted that Fou-
cault rejects anthropology as a valid or productive domain of investigation (Gutting 
1989, Han-Pile 1998), LL reveals that Foucault’s conception of anthropology also 
comprehends the pragmatic domain of reflection, and is therefore not exhausted by 
the search for a fundamental human essence. In fact, Foucault also classifies as 
broadly anthropological 19th century developments that increasingly reject the no-
tion of transcendental a priori critique in favor of a thoroughly empirical, historically 
situated, and politicized (thus practical, or pragmatic) conception of critique—
much, as I will argue, Foucault does. Thus, Foucault’s indebtedness to Kant is not 
limited to his reappropriation of the Kantian ‘transcendental’, interrogating the 
“conditions of possibility” of the “self-referential subject” (Allen 2003: 190); Fou-
cault ascribes himself to the practical implications of this ‘pragmatic’ conception of 
subjectivity, which for him is also part of the Kantian legacy. 
I start by explaining Foucault’s negative appraisal of Kantian anthropology in 
IKA: what he takes its failed aspects to be (Section II). In the subsequent section 
(III), I reconstruct Foucault’s positive appraisal: the aspects of this project that he 
takes to be recoverable. In Section IV, I turn to LL, showing how Foucault traces 
both the negative and positive dimensions of anthropology post-Kant—and thus 
how he situates himself relative to this tradition as he conceives of it. In the final 
section (V), I argue that in Foucault’s analysis of the history of philosophy, anthro-
pology and critique gradually merge into one. This merging also occurs in Fou-
cault’s own thought, despite his care in determining which aspects of anthropology 
to reject and which to accept. I conclude that if we conceive of Foucault as rejecting 
                                                             
4 See also Beiser (1987) for a book-length treatment. As this work makes clear, the appeal to a 
socially situated account of reason does not originate with Hegel and Marx, but is prefigured by 
Kant’s ‘metacritical’ contemporaries, including Hamann and Herder. Kant’s engagement with these 
figures may have played a role in the increasing relevance of ‘practical anthropology’ in his moral 
philosophy: see Zammito (2002) and Wood (2003). 
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this tradition’s appeal to an essentialized conception of subjectivity, what remains 
of anthropology is its inherent practical reflexivity. It is in these terms that we can 
make sense of Foucault’s own conception of ethics as one’s relation to oneself. 
 
 
II. Foucault’s appraisal of the negative dimension of anthropology 
 
Commentators on APV have tended to focus primarily on its account of ‘moral 
character’ and contribution to practical philosophy (Frierson 2003, Wilson 2007, 
Wood 2003), whereas a shift in Kant’s theoretical position has been noted only in 
OP, not APV (Förster 2005, Friedman 1992). Foucault, by contrast, claims that 
APV (1798) introduces a shift in Kant’s view of the subject from CPR (1781-1787), 
one which inaugurates many of the constitutive features that characterize the his-
tory of philosophy post-Kant.5 He argues, first, that the distinction posited between 
pure apperception and inner sense in CPR loses its conceptual priority in the wake 
of a concern for a ‘unified’ conception of subjectivity and self-knowledge in APV. 
Second, he cites the increasing conceptual priority given to the Gemüt, the mind 
taken as a whole and considered in terms of its empirical determinations (e.g., sen-
sation and self-affection), and which entails the emergence of a new concept—Geist 
or spirit—as the Gemüt’s ‘animating principle’. Foucault attributes the development 
of 19th-20th century transcendental philosophy and phenomenology, as well as the 
human sciences, to the increasing conceptual split between Geist and Gemüt. 
According to a prominent strand of Kant interpretation, transcendental self-
consciousness or the ‘I think’ in CPR constitutes the linchpin of Kant’s system, but 
is unable fully to be situated within the terms of that same system. For example, 
Strawson claims that the ‘I think’ represents “the tangential point of contact be-
tween the field of noumena and the world of appearances”, referring presumably to 
the Third Antinomy, where Kant asserts that it is because man “knows himself also 
through pure apperception” that he can know that he is free (1966: 173; 
A546/B574). Yet Kant’s affirmation here that pure apperception can constitute 
                                                             
5 Despite composing IKA in 1959-1960 in Hamburg, where Kant’s manuscripts were held, Foucault 
may not have worked with the manuscripts themselves (see discussion in Nigro 2008: 9, 13). Fou-
cault dismisses the student notes comprising our current record of Kant’s lectures on anthropology, 
on which APV is based: “It is hard to have confidence in notes published 35 years after Kant’s death” 
(1961: 12). Nevertheless, some of the points Foucault cites as novel in APV are already in lectures 
dated contemporaneously to CPR, putting pressure on, or even contradicting, aspects of his analysis 
(see notes 9 and 15 below). However, my interest in this paper is to shed light on Foucault’s own 
position without systematically evaluating its philological veracity. See Guyer (2003), Stark (2003), 
and Brandt (2003) for discussion of the history of the composition of APV. 
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self-knowledge, and that this mode of self-knowledge is required in order to discern 
our own practical agency, explicitly contradicts Kant’s earlier denial that pure ap-
perception can constitute knowledge: “We know our own subject only as appear-
ance, not as it is in itself”, since the ‘I think’ absent empirical intuition is “entirely 
empty” and can at best be “taken only problematically” (B156, A355, A347). As a 
result, Strawson concludes that, when it comes to Kant’s account of subjectivity, 
Kant’s theory is shown to be “shaking itself to pieces” (174).6 
In OT, Foucault concurs with this tradition of interpretation: Kant’s transcen-
dental subject, “which is never given to experience (since it is not empirical), but 
which is finite (since there is no intellectual intuition), determines in its relation to 
an object = x all the formal conditions of experience in general” (1966: 256). That 
is, the Kantian subject cannot be known, but must in some sense be empirical (and 
thus knowable), even as it determines the conditions of knowledge as such. Fou-
cault argues that the gap Kant introduces where a subject should seem to be irrev-
ocably shaped the direction of philosophy post-Kant. If Kant left open a space he 
refused to fill, it remained to his German Idealist successors to do so. As White 
Beck notes almost two hundred years after the fact, it seems only obvious that what 
Kant’s theory of cognition lacks is “a transcendental physiology of thinking nature”, 
which “would give good reasons for the otherwise brutally factual attributes of mind 
which are presupposed without argument in the Critique” (1978: 35). What White 
Beck describes as a ‘transcendental physiology of thinking nature’ is, I would posit, 
what Foucault characterizes as ‘anthropology’, a notion he traces through the hu-
man sciences and post-Kantian philosophy back to APV. White Beck defines this 
general project of investigating the “nature and justification… of the knowledge 
claims used in [CPR]” as a ‘metacritique’ of pure reason (1978: 25). In IKA, Fou-
cault details the ongoing dialogue Kant held during his own lifetime with two of 
his most prominent ‘metacritics’, J.S. Beck and J.G. Fichte. 
Both Fichte and Beck reproached Kant for his lack of a unified account of sub-
jectivity in his theory of cognition. Kant’s framework, they argue, makes self-pos-
iting or self-affection impossible, since if intellectual self-consciousness (pure ap-
perception) is merely logical and has no object, it seems to preclude the possibility 
of empirical self-consciousness (inner sense), in which the self is to be posited as an 
object. The ultimate consequence of Kant’s inadequate treatment of self-positing is 
a “double self”—a subject divided between its active and passive guises to the extent 
                                                             
6 Strawson’s critique has continued to be broadly influential (Keller 2004: 1); see Cassam (1997) for 
a contemporary elaboration of Strawson’s central argument for the embodied rather than purely 
intellectual character of the ‘I’, and Kitcher (2011) and Longuenesse (2017) for responses. 
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that achieving unity between the two seems irretrievable (1961: 23).7 Both concur 
that what Kant took to be a merely theoretical faculty, namely pure apperception, 
has a fundamentally practical dimension, and that a unified account of subjectivity 
can only be derived by stressing the ‘I think’’s practical function as what posits the 
object of inner sense (and thus as what posits itself). 
Foucault notes that Beck’s line of criticism runs contemporaneously to the pub-
lication of APV; while Kant ultimately leaves Beck’s concerns unanswered, Fou-
cault argues that the exchange between the two philosophers helps explain the shift 
in Kant’s theoretical position from CPR to APV.8 Several years prior to APV’s 
publication, Kant writes his last letter to Beck, concluding his responses to Beck’s 
criticisms with the remark, “I notice, as I am writing this down, that I do not even 
entirely understand myself” (Correspondence 1999: 482; Foucault 1961: 20). Beck 
sends Kant three letters in which he presses Kant on the problem that the irreduc-
ibility of the understanding to the sensibility poses for the issue of how the subject 
can affect itself and on the relation between theoretical and practical conscious-
ness—letters which went unanswered (Foucault 1961: 21). 
Foucault writes, “In fact, even though the dialogue with Beck would never be 
reestablished, it continued as if at an angle” (1961: 21). In effect, Foucault reads 
APV as Kant’s ‘oblique’ response to Beck’s concerns. In APV, inner sense and pure 
apperception are defined as “consciousness of what man does and consciousness of 
what he feels”, respectively—definitions, Foucault writes, “which overlap those of 
the Critique, but with a certain shift” (1961: 22). By dint of being repeatedly pressed 
by Kantian metacritics such as Beck and Fichte, the post-critical Kant transitions 
to a view on which the theoretical and practical modalities of cognition are drawn 
closer together, and the self can be more explicitly posited as object of knowledge. 
Thus, Foucault sees APV as Kant’s own attempt to respond to the critiques 
                                                             
7 See discussion by Foucault (1961: 23), as well as Kant’s response to this charge in APV (7:141n); 
see also di Giovanni (1985: 38) and Wallner (1984: 294) on the relation between Beck and Fichte’s 
positions. I return to Foucault’s relation to Fichte in Section V below. 
8 Foucault’s reading faces certain textual difficulties. For example, see Kant’s discussion of the ‘I’ in 
LA Collins, dated to 1772-1773: “The little word ‘I’ is not a mere intuition of oneself, but…. also 
expresses a rational substance, for the I expresses that one makes oneself into an object of thoughts 
with consciousness” (LA 25:10). Here, Kant already puts emphasis on positing the self as object 
through intellectual self-consciousness. However, OP, which features explicit discussion of self-
positing, has often been taken to demonstrate a shift in his theoretical position (Förster 2005). Thus, 
Kant’s increasing focus on securing a transition between critique and experience—manifested in late 
texts such as CPJ, OP, and MM—could presuppose a reliance on an anthropological level of inves-
tigation, which in turn implicates Kant’s theory of self-positing. Thus, in my view, Foucault’s anal-
ysis is more plausible if applied to the distance between anthropological and critical registers. Regard-
less, Foucault’s reading of the difficulties associated with the function of anthropology in Kant’s 
critical system can be taken without, I think, assuming his philological analysis. 
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lodged against him by later inheritors of his own critical project. The debate be-
tween Kant, Beck, and Fichte, Foucault claims, “permits one to define the space in 
which an Anthropology, in general, would be possible: a region in which the ob-
servation of the self doesn’t appeal either to a subject in itself, nor to the pure I of 
synthesis, but to a self [un moi] that is an object” (1961: 23). In APV, the ‘self-
object’ can thus become “nothing but the subject such as it is affected by itself” (24; 
compare 7:140-5, 7:160-1). 
It is in this sense that what Foucault terms an ‘anthropology’ becomes possible—
a term that encompasses Kant’s sense of ‘anthropology’, but which also character-
izes, Foucault argues, the course of much of the history of philosophy post-Kant, 
applying to crucial aspects of the views of such thinkers as Hegel, Marx, Freud, and 
Husserl. What it means to engage in anthropology, Foucault maintains, constitutes 
a level of reflection distinct from that of critique: anthropology is concerned not 
with transcendental a priori truths, but with “the analysis of concrete forms of self-
observation” (24). Thus, APV occupies a position that is simultaneously empirical, 
because it treats the self as a ‘concrete’ object of knowledge, and transcendental, 
since, in so doing, it also treats the conditions that render experience possible. What 
in CPR was taken to be a priori and therefore outside the bounds of empirical 
knowledge is now referred back to an empirical ground, namely, the human subject. 
As such, and as Foucault points out in OT, one of the first instantiations of the 
‘empirical-transcendental double’ can be found in APV, even though it was initially 
Kant himself who denounced this confusion as a form of paralogism—and there-
fore, by Kant’s own lights, as incoherent (1966: 352). 
On Foucault’s analysis, APV’s more unified account of subjectivity can only be 
achieved by reformulating the basic terms of Kant’s system. Thus, the ‘I think’ be-
comes more explicitly identified with activity (and thus as practical), and inner sense 
with passivity (and thus as what is given as an object) (1961: 22). Foucault argues 
that part of the repositioning of these two Kantian terms entails an increasing em-
phasis on a new conceptual pairing: Geist and Gemüt. 
Geist is defined in APV as “the principle of the mind [Gemüt] that animates by 
means of ideas.”9 As Foucault points out, however, the category of Geist introduces 
a number of interpretive difficulties in relation to Kant’s theoretical philosophy: 
 
We are dealing here with a Prinzip [principle]. Not with a Vermögen [faculty] like 
memory, attention, or knowledge in general. Nor, moreover, with one of those 
powers (Kräfte) that the Introduction to the Critique of Judgment talks about.10 
                                                             
9 7:246; see also 7:225, cited in Foucault (1961): 37. 
10 See 20:245, 5:167. 
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Nor, finally, with a simple representation like the ‘pure I’ of the First Critique. 
Hence, a principle: but is it determining or regulative? Neither one nor the other, 
if we take seriously that ‘animation’ that is ascribed to it. (1961: 37) 
 
Thus, Geist is not a faculty, a power, or a ‘simple representation’—it is a ‘principle’. 
But this is a cognitive function that seems to fall outside the conceptual space of 
the CPR: if it ‘animates’, it would seem to entail the activity of the understanding, 
but since it is aroused by the ‘ideas’ of the imagination (and thus by intuitions, not 
concepts), it must also involve the receptivity of sensibility. Thus, its function is 
simultaneously transcendental and empirical. 
Foucault’s analysis of Geist in APV corresponds to his interpretation of self-
positing and the inner sense/apperception distinction: in both cases, a function or 
faculty that is difficult to situate within the possible coordinates of CPR takes on 
the role of an organizing principle in APV. Indeed, in both cases, the faculties at 
issue threaten to give rise to transcendental illusion—‘ideas’ for Geist and ‘paralo-
gism’ for the pure ‘I’—and therefore would seem to fall outside the bounds of pos-
sible knowledge. Nevertheless, in APV both become indispensable. With the emer-
gence of Geist comes the simultaneous emergence of the Gemüt, the mind conceived 
as an empirical object of study in human beings.11 Just as the human being can only 
be “cognized” from the “interior” if the transcendental and empirical poles of ap-
perception are reconceived, Geist can only ‘animate’ the Gemüt if it can present it 
with ideas (7:125).12 As Foucault argues, the function of Geist is to “make appear in 
the passivity of the Gemüt, which is empirically determined, the teeming movement 
of ideas… that come together and come apart like so many partial lives that live 
and die in the spirit” (1961: 39). The Gedankenspiel—the “play” of the “mental 
powers” set in motion by the animating ideas of spirit—thereby replaces CPR’s 
inner sense.13  
Foucault argues that Kant’s theoretical system has thus been fundamentally re-
conceived: the conceptual priority no longer rests on the understanding-sensibility 
distinction, but on the Geist-Gemüt distinction that takes its place.14 As Foucault 
                                                             
11 Much as the Gemüt is the empirical counterpart of Geist within Kant’s anthropological system, 
Foucault suggests that the human sciences are the empirical counterpart of transcendental philoso-
phy post-Kant, anticipating the argument of OT; see (1961): 43, 73. 
12 Particularly moral and aesthetic ideas. See Kant’s discussion of spirit in CPJ 5:314. 
13 CPJ 5:313; see discussion in Foucault (1961): 22. 
14 Yet in LA Collins, dating from 1772-3, Kant writes, “Insofar as both [anima and mens] are united 
and the former capacity stands under the moderating influence of the other, it is called animus—
anima is called ‘soul’ [Seele], animus ‘mind’ [Gemüth], mens ‘spirit’ [Geist]…. In regard to the first 
way we are passive, in regard to the other, passive but simultaneously reactive, in regard to the third 
way we are entirely self-active” (25:16). Thus, even prior to CPR, Kant had associated Geist with 
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writes, “We could ask whether Geist, which materializes at the fringes of anthropo-
logical reflection, isn’t an element secretly indispensable to the structure of Kantian 
thought… Geist is at the root of the possibility of knowledge” (40-1).15 Conse-
quently, the organizing dichotomy of Kant’s theoretical system, at least as it pertains 
to anthropology, no longer falls between the empirical and the transcendental, but 
between activity and passivity. 
 
 
III. Foucault’s appraisal of the positive dimension of anthropology 
 
LL clarifies the underlying ambivalence of Foucault’s stance on anthropology 
and critique, which, as I will show, can be traced back through IKA and the rest of 
Foucault’s ensuing oeuvre. In the lectures, Foucault argues that the relation between 
anthropology and critique inaugurated by Kant orders the history of philosophy 
that succeeds him: Kant’s “work linked anthropology and critical thought in a com-
munity of fate that characterizes 19th century philosophical thought” (1953: 47). 
While Kantian critique shows that “we are ‘with the truth’”, anthropology asks after 
the nature of this relation: “What does man have to be in order to be related in this 
way to truth?” (47-8). As a result, anthropology presents itself as a “critique of the 
critique”—in other words, as a form of metacritique (49). 
Foucault’s reading of APV, as early as LL, suggests ways in which Foucault 
situates himself as a positive inheritor of particular aspects of anthropology. Fou-
cault emphasizes the “practical aim”, namely that of “making use of one’s own ex-
perience”, with which APV takes up the faculties which correspond to the three 
Critiques (1953: 40). Foucault suggests that, for Kant, what it means to make use 
of one’s own experience is to judge: as Kant stresses in CPR, judgment, while fun-
damental to the possibility of cognition, cannot be taught, only practiced or exer-
cised, and this only in an empirical context (A133/B172). Thus, APV “is nothing 
other than the ‘manual of this practice’, a ‘treatise for the good use of judgment’” 
(1953: 40). Its aim is to “contribute to the exercise of a [mode of] judgment which 
nevertheless cannot be learned” (1953: 40).16 That is, Foucault implies that APV 
                                                             
activity and spontaneity and Gemüth—as the point of connection between body and spontaneity—
with passivity. See also reference to ‘Geist und Gemüt’ at 25:474, dating from 1775-6. However, see 
also Kant’s metaphysics lectures, where Geist is initially defined as spontaneity without a body 
(28:278). 
15 The centrality of Geist in this passage suggests continuity between Foucault’s reading of Kant and 
his reading of Hegel. See Foucault’s master’s thesis on ‘the transcendental in the Phenomenology of 
Spirit’ written under Jean Hyppolite (Foucault 1949), and discussion in Macherey (ms). 
16 Tiisala (2015) claims that Foucault’s view of discursive rules undergoes a ‘pragmatist turn’ around 
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requires the active involvement of the reader, since it merely provides an occasion 
for the reader’s exercise of her own judgment rather than giving determinate instruc-
tions for its use. As a result, what is most relevant for Kantian anthropology, as 
Foucault interprets it, is not its content, but its form: not the specific pieces of advice 
it proffers, but their effects—as well as the relation it establishes with its readership 
in the process. 
Foucault’s analysis in LL accords with important passages in IKA that have 
widely escaped notice by commentators. For example, Foucault emphasizes Kant’s 
conception of the ‘pragmatic’. As Kant scholars have acknowledged, Kantian prag-
matic reason is not technical, or self-preservational, rationality; nor, on the other 
hand, is it identical to moral reason.17 The pragmatic subject of APV is not the 
abstract, universal practical subject located outside the reaches of space and time; 
instead, the pragmatic subject is the practical agent reconceived as the concrete, 
historically situated, socialized subject embedded in a process of ‘self-making’ 
(Wood 2003: 41). As Foucault articulates the distinction: 
 
The Anthropology is pragmatic in the sense that it does not consider man as be-
longing to the moral republic of minds [cité morale des esprits] (that would be 
called practical) nor to a civil society composed of subjects of law (that would 
then be juridical); it considers man as ‘citizen of the world’… To be a ‘citizen of 
the world’ is to belong to a region at once as concrete as that of a specific set of 
juridical rules and as universal as that of the moral law. (1961: 26) 
 
To be a ‘citizen of the world’ is both to be the empirical subject of contingent so-
cialization and historical positioning and to be the possible subject of practical rea-
son.18 Thus, pragmatic knowledge, Kant tells us (and as Foucault stresses), concerns 
“the investigation of what [the human being] as a free-acting being makes of him-
self” (Kant 7:119). This mode of knowledge, however, is neither a priori, nor quite 
empirical. Instead, it corresponds to a kind of situated know-how: anthropology 
“must come after our schooling” and requires the ‘having’ of a world rather than the 
                                                             
1967 with the composition of the Archaeology of Knowledge. LL and IKA seemingly anticipate this 
shift, since in both Foucault unearths a different possible conception of subjectivity in Kant—the 
Kantian pragmatic subject whose judgment must be exercised in empirical experience rather than 
explicitly given rules. 
17 Here I am restricting myself to Kant’s invocation of ‘pragmatic’ in APV, since this term has dif-
ferent meanings in others of Kant’s texts. See Wood (1999: 203-205; 2003) for a taxonomy of the 
various senses of the term. 
18 Many Kantians would insist that Kant’s practical subject already is the empirically situated histor-
ical subject (see, e.g., Herman 1993, 2007). However, as Foucault emphasizes, the coexistence of 
these two dimensions is more explicit in the pragmatic agent of APV than in Kant’s texts on moral 
philosophy of the critical period. 
Vaccarino Bremner 
“Anthropology as Critique: Foucault, Kant, and the Metacritical Tradition” 
11 
mere ‘knowing’ of it—a distinction Kant glosses as the distinction between partic-
ipating in a play rather than merely watching it (7:120). Thus, the knowledge at 
issue is acquired not just for its own sake, but in order to be put to use. 
The pragmatic subject, then, exhibits a kind of autonomy: by definition, she is 
a being who embodies a degree of discretion in how to fashion herself. However, 
the pragmatic subject must always begin from a determinate, socially specific start-
ing point, and pragmatic knowledge must always be filtered back through her social 
context: ‘Pragmatic’, as Kant defines it in LA Mrongovius, “is the knowledge from 
which a general use in society can be made” (25:1210, cited in Foucault 1961: 32). 
The domain of the pragmatic involves a mode of autonomy that is more creative 
than strictly moral, retaining a socially shaped character. 
While APV is the initial source of the ‘anthropological illusion’ Foucault so 
vehemently rejects, it is also the source of the mode of engaging in practical, histor-
ically situated critique to which the late Foucault explicitly ascribes. The pragmatic 
subject, as Kant conceives of it, is also the Weltbürger (7:120), a term whose double 
meaning Foucault stresses. The Weltbürger is the sociohistorically situated subject, 
“man as residing in the world” (Foucault 1961: 34). But the Weltbürger is also Kant’s 
cosmopolitan [weltbürgerlicher] subject, a mode of subjectivity which only the his-
torical emergence of the Enlightenment has enabled to come into being, and con-
sequently an unmistakably Enlightenment subject.19 Thus, Foucault interprets 
Kant’s claim that anthropology is “knowledge of the world” (7:120) as a “cosmo-
politan idea, which has programmatic value, where the world would appear more 
as a republic [cité] to be built than as a cosmos given at the outset” (1961: 20). The 
anthropological Kant even takes up the position in WE that Foucault famously 
adopts as the basis for his own ethical approach (1984c), concluding the first section 
of APV with the claim: 
 
The most important revolution from within the human being is ‘his exit from 
his self-incurred immaturity’. Before this revolution he let others think for him 
and merely imitated others or allowed them to guide him by leading-strings. 
Now he ventures to advance, though still shakily, with his own feet on the 
ground of experience. (7:229)20 
 
Thus, WE and the practical dimension of APV are situated at the same pragmatic 
                                                             
19 Of course, Foucault’s references to the ‘Weltbürger’, or cosmopolitan, should not be taken as an 
endorsement of Kant’s universalism or historical teleology, which is why I take him to stress its 
literal meaning as the subject residing in its worldly context as currently constituted. 
20 Compare Kant’s definition of enlightenment as one’s “exit from immaturity” and walking “without 
leading-strings” (8:33). 
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level of reflection21 insofar as both concern what subjects of the Enlightenment 
should ‘make of themselves’. 
The ‘pragmatic’ level of practical reflection seems to be what Foucault himself 
invokes in his analyses of the ‘golden age’ of practices of the self in Hellenistic and 
Roman antiquity. Kant’s engagement with Hufeland’s Makrobiotik and expression 
of a desire to write a “Dietetic”, factors Foucault cites as directly influential on Kant’s 
composition of APV (1961: 29), constitute the same subject matter as what Fou-
cault treats in Chapter II, “Dietetic”, of HS2 (1984b). Indeed, Foucault already uses 
the term “travaux spirituels”, spiritual efforts or tasks, to describe the practices Kant 
himself takes up in relation to his old age, practices that echo Foucault’s analysis of 
the role of old age in the practices of the self, or “spirituality”, of late antiquity 
(1961: 29; compare 1982: 16-20, 104-107). Many of Kant’s themes in APV 
(“dreams, problems of nutrition and digestion, reflections on the opportune time 
for thought”) are the same themes Foucault finds of interest in antiquity (1961: 31). 
Kant exhibits the same interest in self-mastery through practical techniques as Fou-
cault’s Stoics: “We therefore see how the movements of the body… can be mastered 
by the movements of the spirit and their free exercise” (1961: 31). 
What the ‘pragmatic’ point of view seems to involve for Foucault, whether in 
Kant’s Anthropology or Plato’s Alcibiades, is a popular, practical guide, directed as 
advice towards an ordinary reader (one historically and culturally situated in the 
same fashion as the author) for everyday use. Thus, APV is a “book of daily exer-
cise”, and not one of “theory” or a “schoolbook” (1961: 33). It therefore requires 
regular employment on the part of its reader: “the present, imperious, and perpet-
ually renewed form of daily usage” (33). Similarly, Foucault will declare in the In-
troduction to HS2: 
 
The domain that I will analyze is constituted by texts that claim to give rules, 
opinions, and advice on how to behave as one should: ‘practical’ texts, which are 
themselves objects of a ‘practice’ to the extent that they were made to be read, 
learned, meditated on, utilized, put to the test and which, ultimately, were in-
tended to constitute the armature for daily conduct. (1984b: 18) 
 
In both cases Foucault takes up the issue of ‘practical’ texts which themselves be-
come objects of an everyday ‘practice’. Connected with this function is APV’s status 
as a self-cognizantly “popular” text, repeating CPR “on the popular level of advice, 
                                                             
21 This connection is even more explicit in LL; see my discussion below of Foucault’s references to 
Kant as “Aufklärer” (1953: 92). Moreover, Foucault’s 1950s notes on Kant cite Kant’s reference in 
the Preface of CPR to the “maturity of judgment of an age which can no longer content itself with 
the mere appearance of knowledge” (Foucault undated: 5-6, compare CPR: Axi, my emphasis).  
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storytelling, and example” which “can be found for every reader” (1961: 55, 59). 
The ‘popular’ dimension of this text resonates with the same aspect of another 
Kantian text from which Foucault claims to derive his notion of a ‘critical attitude’ 
(and with it, his ethical standpoint): “We shouldn’t forget that [‘What Is Enlight-
enment?’] was a newspaper article… [and thus] is inscribed in a certain relationship 
with the public which it intends to mobilize” (1978: 41). In both cases, Kant aims 
to address a mass audience in a way that has only become possible under the appro-
priate historical conditions—namely, those of modernity. 
The negative and positive dimensions of Foucault’s treatment of anthropology 
resurface in OT, where Foucault’s explicit references to ‘anthropology’ are unam-
biguously negative. As Foucault argues there, Kant woke philosophy from its dog-
matic slumber, only to lull it back into an “anthropological slumber”; indeed, Fou-
cault claims that “‘anthropologization’ is nowadays the great internal threat of 
knowledge” (1966: 351, 258).22 Even here, however, Foucault retains the concep-
tion of a potentially positive upshot of the tradition of philosophical anthropology. 
While, in OT, Foucault famously predicts the death of man, he also speaks favor-
ably of Nietzsche’s conception of the übermensch, situated as the culmination of 
philosophical anthropology in LL, as what might both hasten its downfall and take 
its place. Foucault insists that the death of man won’t present us with a “void” that 
we will have to fill, but instead with the opening of conceptual space necessary to 
think afresh the old anthropological presumptions of philosophical thought (353). 
This is the conclusion that Foucault reaches in the final line of IKA: “The trajectory 
of the question: Was ist der Mensch? in the field of philosophy comes to an end in 
the response that rejects and disarms it: der Übermensch” (79). 
It might appear curious why Foucault would supplant the ‘death of man’ with 
the apparent smuggling-in of a different kind of subject—the ‘overman’. But we 
have begun to see what Foucault’s motivations for doing so consist in. The prag-
matic subject, whose practical, reflexively oriented task is to ‘make something of her-
self’ and ‘think for herself,’23 is what remains once the transcendental-empirical con-
fusion of the subject as object of theoretical knowledge has been rejected as un-
sound. Thus, while the specific content of anthropology—its appeal to a determinate 
and universal human nature—is rejected as historical, empirical, and socially situ-
ated (and thus contingent), it retains its ‘pragmatic’, practical and reflexive, form. 
That is, Foucault is only committed to the practical self-relation by which the 
                                                             
22 See also Foucault’s bleak references to ‘anthropological individualization’ and ‘juridico-anthropo-
logical functioning’ in Discipline and Punish (1975: 100, 183). 
23 See Kant’s repeated references to the ‘maxim of enlightenment’: 7:200, 5:294. 
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subject can ‘make itself’ according to its own choosing, taking its historical situat-
edness as a starting point. While the term ‘anthropology’, when explicitly invoked, 
increasingly acquires an unambiguously negative meaning for Foucault throughout 
the 1960s and 1970s (most centrally in OT), the positive implications Foucault 
initially notices in the anthropological tradition are recovered in his elaboration of 
concepts such as practices of the self or aesthetics of existence at the end of his life—
Foucault’s eventual response, in my view, to his 1966 appeal to the Übermensch.24 
 
 
IV. Kant’s metacritics 
 
Now that I have outlined the main features of Foucault’s ambivalent stance to-
wards anthropology, I will attempt to clarify how Foucault reads the post-Kantian 
history of philosophy as motivated by the very tension between anthropology and 
critique that generates Foucault’s own ambivalence. As I argue here, Foucault holds 
that the history of Kantian reception in the ‘critical’ tradition that interests him25 
draws much more from critique in its pragmatic mode than as transcendental and 
a priori. Moreover, Foucault’s point here is not just philological, but genealogical: 
that is, Foucault’s analysis is not merely historical in aim, but traces the philosoph-
ical lineage of his own thought.26 
In LL, Foucault sketches this metacritical strand from Kant to Hegel, Feuer-
bach, Marx, and Nietzsche. Many of these thinkers, Foucault argues, aim to “over-
come critique by undertaking an anthropology—that’s to say, to do away with cri-
tique by giving it the human being itself as a foundation” (1953: 52). Foucault 
claims that Hegelian thought, for example, features two anthropologies: the partic-
ular section that sports the title, but also the “whole movement of subjective spirit” 
(53). Thus, Hegel is transitional: on the one hand, he, like Kant, exemplifies the 
explicitly defined split between critique, positioned as central to his philosophical 
system, and anthropology, positioned on the margins. On the other, his mode of 
critique is fundamentally anthropological, thereby exemplifying the collapse of the 
two modes of analysis into each other; Hegel’s critique takes itself to be both 
                                                             
24 See discussion in Allen (2003: 89). 
25 See Foucault (1982: 29-30, 1983a: 22). In both courses, Foucault links “all 19th century philoso-
phy… Hegel of course, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Husserl in the Krisis, and Heidegger 
as well” to the “structures of spirituality” of antiquity (1982: 29); see discussion below. 
26 Foucault’s 1950s notes on Kant also feature perhaps his first usage of ‘genealogy’, which he em-
ploys in describing Kant’s tribunal of reason (undated: 6; compare CPR Aix). 
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empirical and transcendental, thus tending toward psychologism and paralogism.27 
Foucault notes that for spirit, “knowledge is determined by itself” and “has an im-
mediate relation to itself”, embodying a similar reflexivity as the Kantian pragmatic 
(53). 
Feuerbach and Marx extend this tendency further, more explicitly aiming to 
undertake critique purely on the level of anthropology: what is relevant for them is 
not what constitutes the mere possibility of knowledge, but concrete knowledge, since 
it is only the latter with which we operate (1953: 56). 
As Foucault reads him, Feuerbach presents a rupture of Kantian thought, even 
as his general project remains in many respects continuous with it. Much as Fou-
cault initially stresses the inherent reflexivity of the Kantian critical project, charac-
terizing anthropology as a critique of critique, he terms the aim of Feuerbach’s cri-
tique as a “superceding [dépassement] of the initial superceding [dépassement]” 
(1953: 72). Thus, Feuerbach’s anthropological philosophy shares the same internal 
structure of Kant’s philosophical anthropology. Foucault reinforces this interpreta-
tion when he remarks that Feuerbach “retraverses Kantian reflection, to the extent 
that it seems to come back at times, and in fact does come back to, a style of Auf-
klärung”, situating Feuerbach in the tradition of Kantian enlightenment to which 
he will repeatedly refer in his final ethical period (66). 
Indeed, Foucault insists, the two poles of anthropology and critique were never 
so far apart to begin with. Citing the distinction between “moral, political, psycho-
logical critique”, such as the “Christian critique of fallen nature [nature déchue]”, 
and “philosophical critique as the determination of a priori conditions of 
knowledge”, Foucault writes: 
 
These two senses of critique were not as different as they are for us: Kant takes 
himself to be an Aufklärer [enlightener] (extricate the philosophical meaning of 
the Aufklärung [enlightenment]). But most importantly, his work, far from inval-
idating this superficial relationship, only ever deepened it, by turning it inside out 
once it found that the interrogation of man was the foundation of critique. (1953: 
75-6) 
 
That is, anthropology—the appeal to a human subject as the ground of critique—
is already implicit in the political subtext of Kantian critique, by which it assumes a 
historical and social specificity and a collective rather than solely individual effort.28 
                                                             
27 This anthropological reading, which Derrida (1969) rejects as distorted by the influence of 
Kojève’s lectures on Hegel, was not uncommon in France at the time; see also discussion in Butler 
(1987: 63-65) as well as Foucault’s critique of Hegel in OT (1966: 261). I am indebted to an anon-
ymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
28 See O’Neill (1989). 
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Critique thereby comes to negate its initial claim to abstraction from empirical con-
ditions, developing into “the very movement of political reform” (76). 
Foucault reads Marx as providing yet another iteration of metacritique, calling 
into question Feuerbach’s notion of alienation. The subject of alienation is not the 
“essence of the human subject”, as per Feuerbach, but the “real human subject” 
(1953: 80). But, Foucault asks, “what does it mean to say that the real human sub-
ject [homme] has become estranged from himself: that reality has become estranged 
from reality? What can alienation mean if it’s deprived of the metaphysical foun-
dation of [having an] essence?” (80). For Marx, alienation therefore has to do not 
with the essence of humanity, but with the “set of work conditions in a given soci-
ety” (82). This position, Foucault notes, is in tension with Marx’s humanism, since 
“all humanism is a revindication of human essence” (83). Consequently, Marxist 
philosophy can only be rooted in a conception of alienation which Foucault claims 
that Marxism has “rightly disassociated itself from and rejected” (83). The tension 
between Marxism and humanism or philosophical essentialism can only give way 
to Marx’s dropping of all metaphysical (for Foucault, ‘philosophical’) pretext.29 
Marxism therefore heralds the end of a claim to a strictly a priori domain of analysis, 
exempted from the imperfections and inconsistencies of the empirical world. 
Foucault argues that the critical tradition he demarcates in these lectures cul-
minates with Nietzsche,30 who, in heralding the arrival of the overman, marks the 
arrival of the ‘death of man’—the beginning of the end of anthropology. At the 
same time, Foucault argues that some of the concerns implicit in anthropology from 
the outset split off into a new domain of analysis altogether. This domain continues 
to seek, or implicitly presuppose, an essential human nature, which, as Foucault 
argues throughout the 1960s and 1970s, lives on in certain approaches in psychol-
ogy, neuroscience, and related domains,31 but here all philosophical pretext is 
dropped. Broadly speaking, the path culminating in Nietzsche, on the other hand, 
scrutinizes the conditions of social reality and the status of collectively held truths; 
this strand, for Foucault, constitutes the true legacy of the critical tradition. For 
both strands, anthropology in its classical sense is ultimately “surpassed” and 
“erased”, but for two distinct reasons: for the first, because philosophical anthro-
pology gives way to methods of biological and medical investigation, losing all prac-
tical import; for the second, because the practical force of anthropology is instead 
                                                             
29 Foucault’s 1952-3 critique of the essentialism of Marxian alienation therefore predates Althusser’s 
(1965) famous critique of the same point. See also Wood on the lack of adequate argument for 
species being (1981: 18) and Cohen on the drawbacks of Marx’s ‘philosophical anthropology’ (1978: 
345-7). 
30 In LL, Foucault also considers Dilthey and Heidegger, which I bracket due to space constraints. 
31 The connection between anthropology and the human sciences is also a key target of Foucault’s 
critique in IKA and OT; I lack the space to discuss it at greater length here. 
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radicalized, losing its pretext to a metaphysical foundation and, with it, its reliance 
on the fact of an essential human nature (1953: 103, 104). The ultimate inheritor 
of the latter strand is Nietzsche. It is Nietzsche who ultimately does away with the 
notion of ‘man’ or the human subject; and it is Nietzsche whose philosophy “aban-
dons the task of philosophizing”, who realizes an “Unphilosophie”, an antiphiloso-
phy, due in part to his skepticism of the validity of the a priori and transcendental 
subject (141, 140). In so doing, Nietzsche further radicalizes Marx’s implicit ‘end-
ing of all philosophy’. 
 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
The way in which Foucault situates himself relative to the anthropological, met-
acritical tradition he delineates throughout LL clarifies several points of interpre-
tation. It is well-known that Foucault sees himself as taking up a Nietzschean ap-
proach in his own philosophy. What is new, however, is that in these early texts 
Foucault does not simply position Nietzsche in contrast to the rest of the philosoph-
ical tradition, but stresses Nietzsche’s continuity with this tradition—even as Nie-
tzsche, much like his predecessors, alters its course. Thus, as I mentioned in Section 
III, Nietzsche’s positioning as the culmination of philosophical anthropology allows 
us to dispel the unambiguously negative appraisal of anthropology in OT that has 
often been ascribed to it (Gutting 1989, Han-Pile 1998); Foucault’s heralding of 
the Übermensch at the conclusion of OT can be situated, in my reading, along with 
the positive evaluation of the ‘pragmatic’ aspects of anthropology advanced in IKA 
and LL. 
A similar analysis can be advanced with regard to Foucault’s own self-position-
ing: he does not situate himself outside this tradition, occupying an epistemic po-
sition some have criticized as untenable (e.g., Gutting 1989). Instead, on my read-
ing, Foucault is a metacritic: his critique, like Nietzsche’s, refutes the essentialist or 
naturalist tendencies of anthropology, but is still in line with this tradition’s growing 
emphasis on the empirical domains of history, of political change, and of the inter-
rogation of the ‘illusion’—or, for Foucault, the apparent obviousness or seeming 
universality (Tiisala 2017)—of socially produced concepts. This is what explains 
why Foucault, in the final years of his life, would return repeatedly to this ‘critical’ 
strand of Western philosophy, reiterating that it constitutes the tradition in which 
he situates himself. As he says in 1982 and 1983, “It’s this form of philosophy that, 
from Hegel to the Frankfurt School, in passing through Nietzsche, Max Weber, 
etc., created a form of reflection with which, of course, I identify myself to the 
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extent that I can”, and that implicitly “rediscovers the care for the care of the self” 
(1983a: 22, 1982: 30). 
Stressing Foucault’s reading of how Nietzsche, Marx, Feuerbach, and Hegel de-
velop out of a particular strand of responding to Kant—one that, according to Fou-
cault, is more continuous with Kant’s political and anthropological writings than 
his explicitly ‘critical’ ones—allows us to see how Foucault may have viewed the 
connection between these thinkers, all pivotal in distinct ways for his own thought. 
To see this, these lectures should be understood as Foucault’s attempt to undertake, 
not just genealogy as critique, but a genealogy of critique (which in itself functions 
as a kind of metacritique). As we’ve seen, while critique comes in different historical 
forms, it shares the same underlying metacritical attitude (where Foucault (1984c: 
1396) simply refers to a critical attitude), enabling its own historical dynamicism: 
the movement of metacritique is inherently non-universal and non-constant, re-
calling Foucault’s definition of a limit-attitude in “What Is Enlightenment?”.32 It 
would seem, then, that Foucault here undertakes a genealogy of his own philosoph-
ical position, reaffirming its own particular historicity and lack of universality in the 
process—and, in a sense, thereby reinforcing its own validity.33 
While scholars such as Allen (2003, 2008) and Djaballah (2008) have acknowl-
edged the importance of Foucault’s early engagement with Kant in establishing the 
continuity in Foucault’s conception of autonomy or critique, no one has yet 
acknowledged that the more general framework of Foucault’s ethical approach is 
already extant in rudimentary form in Foucault’s early engagement with the history 
of critique.34 For example, Foucault insists repeatedly that the metacritical tradition 
embodies an internal reflexivity as its basic form: he refers variously to Kant’s cri-
tique of critique, Feuerbach’s supercession of a supercession, and Hegel’s self-de-
termination of thought. What remains of metacritique—once critique gives rise to 
anthropology, the two pulled increasingly close together, critique becoming funda-
mentally altered by anthropology, and anthropology finally ejected altogether—is 
just this formal reflexivity in structure. Once the anthropological pretenses are hol-
lowed out, the result is a structural reflexivity without a constituting subject. One 
key aspect of Foucault’s own eventual metacritical stance, then, is the refutation of 
the very idea of anything other than a thin, purely formal conception of the practical 
                                                             
32 “In what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is 
singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary constraints?” (1984c). 
33 Foucault often characterizes this mode of critique in Kantian terms. For example, he criticizes 
anthropological thought for “swimming in total paralogism” (1965: 480). 
34 This explanatory route has the benefit of not resting the basis for Foucault’s ethics wholly on his 
references to ‘autonomy’. See Koopman’s critique of Allen on this point (2013: 206-8, 221-2). 
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agent, to be conceived solely as a reflexive relation to oneself: “The self is nothing 
other than relations to self. The self is a relation” (1983b: 117). Foucault critiques 
conventional understandings of morality on this score:  
 
In order to be called ‘moral’, an action can’t be reduced to an act or a series of acts 
that conform to a rule, a law, or a value…. [Moral action] also implies a certain 
relation to the self; this is not only ‘self-consciousness’, but self-constitution as a 
‘moral subject’… He acts on himself, undertakes to know himself, control him-
self, test himself, perfect himself, transform himself. (1984b: 35)35 
 
While Kant’s conception of practical reason is no doubt included in Foucault’s crit-
icism, I submit that the initial, though still rudimentary, articulation of Foucault’s 
point is already present in Kant’s definition of what it means to be pragmatic: to 
make something “of oneself as a free-acting being” (7:119, my emphasis).36 
If we examine Foucault’s later self-ascriptions in the 1970s and 1980s, we can 
see how his early analysis of the metacritical tradition in the 1950s and 1960s is in 
continuity with his later views. In texts such as “What Is Critique?” (1978) and 
“What Is Enlightenment?” (1984c), Foucault characterizes the philosophical di-
mension of his life’s work as that of a creative reappropriation of Kant’s critical 
project, situating himself in the Enlightenment tradition. In the opening sentence 
of an encyclopedia entry for himself, Foucault opts to characterize his own philo-
sophical project as follows: “If Foucault is to be inscribed in the philosophical tra-
dition, it is in the critical tradition which is that of Kant” (1984a: 1450). In “What 
Is Enlightenment?”, Foucault writes, “If the Kantian question was that of knowing 
what limits knowledge has to renounce transgressing, it seems to me that the critical 
question today has to be turned back into a positive one…. The point, in brief, is 
to transform the critique conducted in the form of a necessary limitation into a 
practical critique that takes the form of a possible transgression” (1984c: 1393; my 
emphasis). That is, Foucault adheres to the practical conception of critique which, 
                                                             
35 See also Foucault’s definition of ‘subjectivation’ as “the formation of a defined relation of self to 
self” (1980: 227). 
36 While one might think that this reflexivity was already present in Kant’s characterization of the 
merely empty ‘I think’ of theoretical cognition accompanying “all my representations” (B131), Fou-
cault only embraces the reflexivity of this conception in its practical form rather than theoretical—
as in Fichte’s emphasis on the dependence of the ‘I think’ on the activity of the subject. See Fou-
cault’s self-description of his “Fichtean” conception of the will as “the pure act of the subject”, where 
the subject, reciprocally, is “what is set and determined by an act of the will” (1979: 41-2). While 
we might then wonder what Foucault took himself to gain from post-Fichtean developments in the 
metacritical tradition, it should be noted that Fichte’s is still the theoretical subject that constitutes 
the ground of its experience and is thus not thoroughly practical in Foucault’s sense. I am indebted 
to an anonymous reviewer for pushing me to clarify this point. 
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he had argued 30 years earlier, was already implicit in Kant’s own understanding of 
his critical project.37 Yet this involves both the negative and positive aspects of Fou-
cault’s initial evaluation of Kantian anthropology. In his encyclopedia entry, Fou-
cault reaffirms the negative appraisal, opposing the appeal by the “anthropological” 
philosophies he rejects to a “constituting subject” to which one can ascribe all 
knowledge in general (1984a: 1453). In its place, however, Foucault situates his 
positive appraisal, endorsing the project of analyzing the “concrete practices” by 
which the subject is constituted—the analyses of the practices of the self that char-
acterize his ‘ethical turn’ in the 1980s (1453). Confirming this interpretation, Fou-
cault identifies the “practical” dimension of his reappropriation of the critical pro-
ject with the elaboration of another “principle of his method”: that of “appealing to 
‘practices’ as a domain of analysis, approaching one’s analysis along the angle of 
what ‘one does’” (1454). 
Thus, Foucault is in continuity with the tradition of anthropology and critique 
insofar as he conceives of himself as rejecting the traditional a priori conception of 
critique, as well as the appeal to “all anthropological universals” which rest on es-
sentializing conceptions of subjectivity (1453). In doing so, what remains is an anal-
ysis of the practices by which subjects are constituted, and by which they constitute 
themselves. Moreover, if Foucault defines critique as essentially characterized by 
continuous, reflexive self-interrogation, this, too, is a practice subjects can employ 
to constitute themselves as critical agents—and thus to begin to interrogate their 
own self-constitution as subjects.38 
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